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I INTRODUCTION 
A good starting point for a discussion of parliamentary sovereignty in early 
twenty- first century New Zealand is the Court of Common Pleas in early seventeenth 
century England, where Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke stated: 1 
. .. it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common Jaw will controul Acts of Parliament, 
and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void : for when an Act of Parliament is against 
common right or reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will 
controul it, and adjudge such Acts to be void .. . 
This famous passage, which seems to clearly state that the courts may overturn 
an Act of Parliament, has from 1610 to 2001, variously been followed, distinguished, 
exported, discussed, and ignored, but never expressly overruled.2 Its sentiments have 
also been revived in the late twentieth century, most notably in New Zealand by Lord 
Cooke, as a Court of Appeal judge and later President of the Court. The question of 
whether courts would ever use the power that Coke CJ asserted in 1610, and Lord 
Cooke hinted at in 1984, remains of interest, involving fundamental constitutional 
issues such as the proper role of the courts and their relationship with the other 
branches of government. 
This paper will examine the decision in Bonham's Case and its treatment by 
later courts and academics. It will then discuss Lord Cooke's "Fundamentals" and the 
criticism and support that have followed, especially Goldsworthy's recent book 
defending parliamentary sovereignty and Justice Thomas's views on the other side of 
the debate. It will conclude, after an examination of the current New Zealand 
constitutional landscape and the political role of judges, by discussing whether, in 
New Zealand in 2001, there is any legitimate basis for a court to challenge the 
sovereignty of Parliament. Or in other words, in this new millennium, would a New 
Zealand court ever be justified in reviewing the validity of legislation? The answer 
will be yes; not as a revolution, but rather by the gradual development of the common 
law and changing constitutional times. 
1 Dr Bonham 's Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 107; 77 ER 638,652 [Bonham's Case]. 
2 It has, however, only ever been cited in one (unreported) New Zealand case, Carter v Police (19 April 
1999) High Court Wellington CP 41/99 Gallen J, where the plaintiff was seeking a declaration as to 
whether the Parliament of New Zealand existed, and Bonham 's Case was not relevant to the issue 
before the court. 
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II DR BONHAM'S CASE AND ITS SUBSEQUENT HISTORY 
A Bonham's Case 
Thomas Bonham was a doctor of physic and graduate of Cambridge 
University who practised medicine in London in the early seventeenth century. He 
was fined and later imprisoned by the Royal College of Physicians for practising 
medicine without the necessary licence from the College. Doctor Bonham brought an 
action against the College for false imprisonment. Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke 
pointed out that under the empowering statute, the College received half of all fines 
levied by them.3 Thus they were not only judges but also parties in any case that 
came before them, and it is an established maxim of the common law that no man can 
be a judge in his own case. He concluded therefore that, " ... when an act of parliament 
is against common right or reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the 
common law will controul it, and adjudge such Acts to be void." 
B The Subsequent History of Bonham's Case 
l 1610 - 1688 
Coke CJ's assertion was not confined to Bonham's Case. He reiterated his 
views soon after in Rowles v Mason, stating that " .. .if there be repugnancy in a 
statute ... the common law disallows and rejects it. "4 And in The Case of 
Proclamations he said that:5 
... an Act of Parliament was made, that all the Irish people should depart the realm ... upon pain 
of death, which was absolutely in terrorem, and was utterly against the law. 
Sir Henry Hobart, Coke CJ's successor in the Common Pleas, upheld his view 
of the common law in both Day v Savadge6 and Sheffield v Radcliffe,7 but did not 
3 14 &15 Hen VIII, c5 . 
4 (1612) 2 Brown 192, 198; 123 ER 892,895. 
5 (1611) 12 Co Rep 74. 
6 
(1614) Hobart 85, 87; 80 ER 235,237. 
7 (1615) Hobart 334, 336. 
2 
refer to Coke CJ who had by then fallen from Royal favour, having been removed 
from the Common Pleas to the Kings Bench in 1613. The Chancellor Lord Ellesmere 
also criticised Coke's Reports, and especially Bonham's Case, saying that it: 8 
derogateth much from the wisdom and power of the parliament, that when the three estates - the 
King, the Lords and the Commons - have spent their labours in making a law, then shall three 
judges on the bench destroy and frustrate all their points because the act agreeth not in their 
particular sense with common right or reason, whereby [Coke] advanceth the reason of a 
particular court above the judgment of all the realm ... For it is Magis Congruum that acts of 
parliament should be corrected by the same pen that drew them, rather than to be dashed in 
pieces by the opinion of a few judges. 
Notwithstanding this criticism, he did not deny the existence of such power. Instead, 
as an opponent of the common law courts, he advocated its exercise only by the Court 
of Chancery. 9 
Coke CJ was later suspended from his office and ordered to "correct" his 
Reports. However, he did not, even after the King demanded an explanation of the 
dictum in Bonham's Case. This defiance was one of the major factors leading to his 
removal from the bench. 
2 The Glorious Revolution 1688 
It is general1y recognised that the revolution of 1688 marked the end of the 
doctrine of Bonham's Case. Coke CJ had bravely tried to use the common law to curb 
the King's growing arrogance, telling King James that the king himself was under 
God and the law. 10 But public opinion, expressed through Parliament, 11 was seen as a 
better safeguard than the operation of the common law, especially given some 
unpopular judicial decisions in the King's favour, 12 and the constitutional settlement 
8 Louis A Knafla Law and Politics in Jacobean England: the Tracts of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 1977) 306-307. 
9 Earl of Oxford's Case [1615] 1 Chan Rep 1, 12; 21 ER 485,488. 
'
0 Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co Rep 63, 65; ER 1342, 1343. 
11 Although it can be noted that only a very narrow section of the public was represented by Parliament 
at this time. 
12 
See, for example, R v Hampden (The Case of Ship-Money) (1637) 3 St Tr 825, and Godden v Hales 
(1686) 11 St Tr 1165. 
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established the supremacy of Parliament over the King, that is, Legislature over 
Executive. However Edwards notes that: 13 
The revolution of 1688 did not assert the supremacy of Parliament. Contrary to popular belief 
the Bill of Rights Act 1688 fails to mention it. It is to the decisions of the courts that we must 
turn in order to discover the legislative limits of Parliament. 
3 1688 -1979 
There were traces of Coke CJ's influence after 1688. In City of London v Wood 
Holt CJ said: 14 
... what my Lord Coke said in Dr Bonham's Case is far from any extravagancy, for it is a very 
reasonable and true saying that if an Act of Parliament should ordain that the same person 
should be party andjudge ... it would be a void Act of Parliament. 
Yet in the same judgment he also says that the validity of an Act cannot be 
questioned. Lord Campbell in 1861 also indirectly supported the doctrine in Green v 
Mortimer15 when he invalidated a private Act of Parliament, and as with Bonham's 
Case, the decision has been explained away as following the rules of statutory 
interpretation. 16 
Blackstone can be said to have buried Bonham's Case. He said, after 
conceding that he knew it was "generally laid down that acts of parliament contrary to 
reason are void," that "if the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which 
is unreasonable, I know of no power ... to control it." 17 And when Dicey's theory of 
parliamentary omnipotence took hold in the nineteenth century, and never let go until 
relatively recently, this stranglehold left no room for Coke CJ's doctrine at all. Dicey 
said English law denied the existence of "any judicial or other authority having the 
right to nullify an Act of Parliament, or to treat it as void or unconstitutional." 18 
Dicey's theory made reference to the work of Blackstone but unsurprisingly, never to 
13 RA Edwards "Bonham's Case: The Ghost in the Constitutional Machine" [1996) Denning LJ 63, 69. 
14
(1701) 12 Mod669,687 . 
15 (1861) 3 LT 642. 
16 
P Wallington "Sovereignty Regained" (1974) 37 MLR 686. 
17 Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (9ed (1783) reprint, Garland Publishing Inc, New 
York and London, 1978) Vol I, 91. 
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Bonham's Case. At this time judicial disapproval of Bonham's Case also became more 
emphatic. In Lee v Bude & Torrington Railway Co, Willes J said: 19 
It was once said, - I think in Hobart, - that, if an Act of Parliament were to create a man judge in 
his own case, the courts might disregard it. That dictum, however, stands as a warning, rather 
than an authority to be followed. We sit here as servants of the Queen and the legislature. Are 
we to act as regents over what is done by Parliament with the consent of the Queen, lords, and 
commons? I deny that any such authority exists. If an Act of Parliament has been obtained 
improperly, it is for the legislature to correct it by repealing it: but, so long as it exists as law, 
the Courts are bound to obey it. 
In 1974 Lord Reid described the doctrine as "obsolete."20 
4 The Export of Dr Bonham to the United States 
Bonham's Case had a different career in America. In 1647 the General Court 
of Massachusetts had ordered two copies of Coke's Reports, and by the end of the 
century there was, as Plucknett says, " ... the first clear example of an act of legislature 
being invalidated by the judiciary m America. "21 Other examples 
followed, 22culminating m the seminal case of Marbury v Madison in 1803.23 
Plucknett concludes that written constitutions "rendered Coke's doctrine 
unnecessary,"24 but Edwards asserts that: 25 
... [a]lthough the American constitution did not expressly provide for judicial review of 
legislation, the Supreme Court appropriated the power, which it has retained ever since ... under 
Marbury v Madison, as in Bonham's Case, the common law is, in fact, controlling acts of the 
legislature. 
18 AV Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (lOed, Macmillan and Co Ltd, 
London, 1960) 91. 
19 (1871) LR 6 CP 576,582. 
20 British Railways Board v Pickin [1974] AC 765, 768 (HL). 
21 T FT Plucknett "Bonham's Case and Judicial Review" (1926) Harv L Rev 30, 62 citing Giddings v 
Browne 2 Hutchinson Papers (Prince Soc 1865) 1-15. 
22 
For example, Robin v Hardaway (1772) Jeff 109, discussed in Plucknett, above, 62-68. 
23 (1803) 1 Cranch 103. 
24 p lucknett, above, 68. 
25 
RA Edwards "Bonham's Case: The Ghost in the Constitutional Machine" [1996] Denning L J 63, 86. 
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The Glorious Revolution may have made Parliament sovereign in England in 1688, 
but in the American colonies Plucknett concluded that: 26 
... the Revolution meant something different. Parliament was not their hero but a distant and 
unsympathetic body in whose deliberations they had no part. When it aroused their resentment, 
therefore, it was natural to remember the teachings of the great Chief Justice .. . 
It can also be noted that John Marshall who, later as Chief Justice, decided Marbury v 
Madison, was at age seventeen, given a copy of Blackstone's Commentaries by his 
father. However, Boyer says "for some reason the boy did not take to it," suggesting 
that he may have been more interested in ideas such as those put forward in Robin v 
Hardaway27 which was reported by his cousin Thomas Jefferson and which cited both 
Bonham's Case and Day v Savadge. 28 
A glance through the legal databases reveals a large number of articles from 
the United States referring to Bonham's Case, and rather less from England and 
Commonwealth countries. Coke CJ appears to have had a greater influence there than 
in his native England. United States academics such as Plucknett and Boyer, perceive 
the limits of parliamentary sovereignty differently to those brought up in the Diceyan 
tradition of the supremacy of Parliament. This must in part be due to these historical 
reasons, and perhaps also because in a federal system the limits on legislatures are 
more clearly defined. 
C What Did Coke CJ Really Mean? 
In Bonham's Case Coke CJ cited various cases to support his conclusion that 
the common law could control Acts of Parliament. 29 In a very detailed analysis of 
these precedents, Plucknett showed that the "books" were either misquoted or 
misunderstood.3° For example, it was only what Coke CJ added to the text of Tregor's 
Case that suggested the common law might override a statute.31 And in citing from 
the one precedent that really did support him, Plucknett concludes that Coke CJ 
26 Plucknett, above, 69. 
27 (1772) Jeff 109. 
28 
Allen Dillard Boyer "Understanding, Authority and Will - Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan 
Origins of Judicial Review" (1997) 37 Boston College L Rev 43, 90. 
29 
Dr Bonham 's Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 107; 77 ER 638,652 [Bonham 's Case]. 
30 
T FT Plucknett "Bonham's Case and Judicial Review" (1926) 40 Harv L Rev 30. 
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" . . . added an explanation and a theory all his own." 32In that case effect was not given 
to a statute, but it was just ignored rather than judged to be void. And as Boyer 
describes it, Coke CJ's dictum seems far less dramatic: 33 
Significantly, of Coke's four brethren on the Common Pleas bench, only one was persuaded by 
his reasoning. Two dissented, and it seems that Justice Warburton gave Coke his 3-2 majority 
only because he concurred in the outcome. 
From a close historical and political analysis of the circumstances surrounding 
the case, Harold Cook has argued that Coke CJ probably did not mean a general 
statement that common law courts could overturn Acts of Parliament, but that he 
meant to overturn a royal charter when it seemed unjust. 34 Or as Cook puts it, "In 
other words, the College itself was without authority to punish unlicensed medical 
practitioners despite the Parliamentary Acts granted to it."35 
Thome has asserted that Coke CJ's decision is "derived from the common law 
rules of statutory interpretation,"36 but acknowledged that although judges had wide 
powers of statutory interpretation, " ... Coke's disregard of the express words of an Act 
probably went beyond them. ',37 Boyer concludes, "[i]t cannot be denied in the end, 
that Coke acted in the belief that courts could strike down statutes which offended the 
common Jaw - that is, which the judges in their wisdom found unreasonable. "38 
Recently one commentator, in rejecting the possibility of Coke CJ merely applying a 
rule of statutory interpretation, bluntly put it this way: 39 
31 
Why did they not say in those very words "a statute contrary to natural equity and reason, or 
repugnant, or impossible to be performed is to be given a reasonable construction? " Is it likely 
that royal judges, confronting a case involving a statute that had necessarily passed both houses 
of parliament and received the royal assent, would lightly use the word "void"? In particular, 
(1335) YB 8 Edw III, Pasch 26. 
32 Plucknett, above, 35-36, citing the anonymous case Cessavit 42. 
33 Allen Dillard Boyer "Understanding, Authority and Will - Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan 
Origins of Judicial Review" (1997) 39 Boston College L Rev 43, 84. 
34 Although it was authorised by statute. 
35 Harold J Cook "Against Common Right and Reason: The College of Physicians Versus Dr. Thomas 
Bonham" (1985) 29 Am J Legal Hist 301,302. 
36 SE Thorne" Dr Bonham's Case" (1938] LQR 543. 
37 Thorne, above, 551. 
38 Allen Dillard Boyer "Understanding, Authority and Will - Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan 
Origins of Judicial Review" (1997) 39 Boston College L Rev 43, 85. 
39 
John V Orth "Did Sir Edward Coke Mean What He Said?" (1999) 16 Const Comment 33. 
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how likely was it when the source, the fons et origo, of the idea in question was none other than 
Sir Edward Coke, the oracle-if ever there was one-of the common law? 
These studies of Bonham's Case have suggested differing explanations of 
Coke CJ's famous statement that the common law could overturn an Act of 
Parliament. It would seem that the Chief Justice used the tools of his trade, 
precedents, but with the knowledge that he was breaking new ground in the assertion 
of this power .. His own words summed up his approach when he wrote, "Let us now 
peruse our ancient authors ... for out of the old fields must come the new come."40 
Ill LORD COOKE'S FUNDAMENTALS 
A The Obiter Dicta 
By 1979 Bonham's Case might reasonably have been regarded as some sort of 
skeleton in the constitutional closet. However, in what was described as "a quiet 
revolution which has been occurring on the benches of the Court of Appeal,"41 Cooke 
J (as he was then), while never directly referring to Bonham's Case, began publicly 
questioning the supremacy of Parliament. In a dissenting judgment on the issue of 
whether the Accident Compensation Corporation enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine whether a person had suffered injury by accident, he said:42 
It would be a strong and strange step for Parliament to attempt to confer on a body other than 
the Courts power to determine conclusively whether or not actions in the Courts are barred. 
There is even room to doubt whether it is self-evident that Parliament could constitutionally do 
so. 
Eighteen months later in Brader v Ministry of Transport where the validity of the car-
less day regulations made under the Economic Stabilisation Act 1948 was questioned, 
Cooke J noted:43 
40 
Sir Edward Coke The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1628 ed, reprint, Garland 
Publishing Inc, New York and London, 1979) 109. 
41 
John L Caldwell "Judicial Sovereignty-A New View" (1984] NZLJ 357. 
42 
L v M [1979] 2 NZLR 519,527 (CA). 
43 
(1981] 1 NZLR 73, 78 (CA). 
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It may be added that the recognition by the common law of the supremacy of Parliament can 
hardly be regarded as given on the footing that Parliament would abdicate its function. It is not 
to be supposed that by the 1948 Act the New Zealand Parliament meant to abandon the entire 
field of the economy to the Executive. 
The following year in a majority decision concerning the validity of wage freeze 
regulations, which prohibited the Arbitration Court from determining disputes of 
interest, the court declared:44 
Indeed we have reservations as to the extent to which in New Zealand even an Act of Parliament 
can take away the rights of citizens to resort to the ordinary Courts of law for the determination 
of their rights. 
Cooke J went further in Fraser v State Services Commission where the issue was 
whether an officeholder had a right to a hearing before being suspended. Noting the 
"fundamental" rule that an officeholder be told what is alleged against him or her and 
given an opportunity to explain, he said:45 
This is perhaps a reminder that it is arguable that some common law rights may go so deep that 
even Parliament cannot be accepted by the Courts to have destroyed them. 
Finally in 1984, where the case concerned the ability of the Poultry Board Act 1980 to 
authorise regulations taking away the common law right to silence, Cooke J, in the 
strongest terms yet said:46 
I do not think that literal compulsion, by torture for instance, would be within the lawful powers 
of Parliament. Some common law rights presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could not 
override them. 
It is perhaps not surprising that Bonham's Case is never mentioned, given the 
ascendancy of "Dicey's Dubious Dogma"47 in the New Zealand setting. In Lord 
Cooke's later article "Fundamentals"48 where his thoughts on Parliamentary 
44 New Zealand Drivers Association v New Zealand Road Carriers [1982] 1 NZLR 374, 390 (CA). 
45 
[1984] 1 NZLR 116, 121 (CA). 
46 
Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] l NZLR 394, 398 (CA). 
47 
G De Q Walker "Dicey's Dubious Dogma of Parliamentary Sovereignty: A Recent Fray with 
Freedom of Religion" (1985) 59 ALJ 276. 
48 
Sir Robin Cooke "Fundamentals" [1988] NZLJ 158. 
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supremacy are explained more fully, he "finds it necessary to get Dicey out of the 
way"49 and does so with great bluntness and speed, recognising Dicey's "immense 
historical weight [as] still continuing among those who prefer not to be troubled by 
much thinking about the subject. "50 Lord Cooke would not "burke the idea of natural 
law," asking: 51 
... can any lawyer in all honesty accept as a viable principle that some infringements of human 
rights are so grave that if enacted in other countries they will not be recognised as law at all by 
us, but that this would not matter if they were enacted by our own legislature? 
He is there referring to a 1976 House of Lords decision where the majority had 
described a Nazi decree against Jews as "so grave an infringement of human rights 
that the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all. "52 
However one wonders what the result would have been if the law in question had 
been an English law. Indeed one Law Lord in this case and two judges in the Court of 
Appeal below had felt compelled to recognise the decree.53 This division reflects the 
1950's jurisprudential debate between Professors Hart and Fuller concerning the 
grudge informer cases, where people living under Nazi jurisdiction used oppressive 
laws to settle personal grudges. Hart, the positivist, held that such laws, since they 
were created in accordance with the operative rule of recognition, were valid, 
notwithstanding their oppressive or immoral content. Therefore courts could not 
punish someone for actions which were permitted by the laws in place. Yet he also 
thought that to not punish was to condone evil, and so was evil in itself, since there is 
a moral duty to disobey such laws. In contrast Fuller argued that post-Nazi judges, in 
deciding how to punish grudge informers, were obliged to consider the validity of 
Nazi laws, and this involved considering the morality of the laws in question.54 Lord 
Cooke's sentiments could be said to accord with the one thing that Hart and Fuller did 
agree on in their debate, beside the fact that the informers should be punished. That is, 
49 
Cooke,above, 160. 
50 Cooke, above, 161. 
51 Cooke,above, 164. 
52 Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] AC 249,278. 
53 Oppenheimer v Catterrmole above 265. 
Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1973] Ch 264. 
54 H LA Hart "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (1958) 71 Harv L Rev 593; Lon L 
Fuller "Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart"(l958) 71 Harv L Rev 630. 
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in some circumstances, even when there is an applicable positive law, people must 
look outside this law when deciding what to do.55 
B Heresy? - Hon M Kirby's Criticism 
Of course Lord Cooke's dicta, described as "some of the most breath-taking 
... ever propounded by a New Zealand judge"56 have been criticised and most 
vigorously by the Hon Michael Kirby, a judge of the High Court of Australia. In the 
BLF case he endorsed Lord Reid's rejection of the Bonham doctrine in Pickin, stating 
that: 57 
. . .if the legislation is clear, and though the judge considers it to be unjust or even oppressive, it 
is not for him to substitute his own opinion for that of the elected representatives assembled in 
Parliament. 
In this case a union had challenged the validity of special legislation which was 
apparently designed to put beyond challenge the action taken to deregister the union 
under another Act, and also to terminate the right of parties to costs in pending 
appellate proceedings. The Court unanimously declared the Act to be valid, although 
not without reservations. Street CJ noted that although it was open to the Parliament 
to cancel the Federation's registration by an express Act of Parliament, the method 
chosen was through barely legitimate legislative interference with the judicial process 
of the Court by directing the outcome of particular legislation.58 
Writing extra-judicially, Hon M Kirby was unrepentant in his Diceyan 
positivism, believing that "[j]udges do not have to appeal to natural law notions, as 
such, to put checks upon Parliament. "59 Instead by the process of statutory 
interpretation, offending legislation can be read down, in some cases reference can be 
55 Richard A Primus "A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional Thought" 
(1996) 106 Yale LJ 423,434. 
56 
John L Caldwell "Judicial Sovereignty - A New View" [1984] NZLJ 357. 
57 Builders Labourers Federation v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372, 406 Kirby 
P. 
58 
Builders Labourers Federation v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372, 379 Street 
CJ. 
59 
Hon Michael Kirby "Lord Cooke and Fundamental Rights" in P Rishworth (ed) The Struggle for 
Simplicity in the Law: Essays for Lord Cooke ofThorndon (Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) 331. 
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had to international human rights norms, and in Australia, to implications from the 
constitution. In his view: 60 
. . . the principle of judicial respect for Parliament is to be taken as one that lies so deep that 
Courts will just accept it so long as Parliament has acted as a Parliament and within power . .. it is 
good that Lord Cooke has sparked this debate but heresy is heresy. And it may be dangerous 
heresy besides. 
But looking at Lord Cooke's dicta in context, it is difficult to see the heresy 
that Hon M Kirby complains of. The language is cautious and guarded, and the 
context is a time in New Zealand when Parliament was, in reality, being run by the 
Executive. The Bill of Rights 1688, which established the Parliament's power over the 
King, did not provide for Parliament to then relinquish it again to the King or Queen 
(through his or her Ministers). Lord Cooke's dicta provided support for the 
implementation of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act in 1990, and perhaps that was 
their function. Rish worth notes " ... there is nothing in the dicta .. . to suggest that Lord 
Cooke would have withdrawn judicial enforcement of legislation lightly .. .it is 
reserved for the unexpected case, the grossly unjust law." 61 
Indeed the House of Lords was far more revolutionary in 1969 when in the 
Anisminic case the clear words of the statute that the findings of the Commission 
"shall not be called into question in any court of law"62 were simply disobeyed. 63 
Lord Reid would have "expected to find something more specific than the bald 
statement that a determination shall not be called into question in any court of law."64 
It must be asked how the statute could have been more specific. It is difficult to accept 
that their Lordships "interpreted" or "read down" the legislation as Hon M Kirby 
would doubtless assert. In any case there must come a point where "reading down" 
legislation is no different to disapplication. In the same way as Coke CJ in 1610 held 
that a man could not be a judge in his own cause, the House of Lords in Anisminic 
asserted that the power of judicial review of executive action, and thus the 
60 Kirby, above, 353. 
61 
Paul Rish worth "Lord Cooke and the Bill of Rights" in P Rish worth (ed) The Struggle for Simplicity 
in the Law: Essays for Lord Cooke of Thorndon (B utterworths, Wellington, 1997) 302. 
62 
Foreign Compensation Act 1950, s 4(4) (UK) . 
63 
Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969) 2 AC 147 (HL) . 
64 
Anisminic, above, 147. 
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fundamental constitutional rule of separation of powers, could not be abolished, even 
by statute. 
Hon M Kirby IDisses the point by believing that the questioning of 
parliamentary sovereignty equates to a desire to shift political power to an unelected 
judiciary. It seems more apparent that Lord Cooke is only arguing for a balance 
between the courts and the legislature. He sees the common law as "built on two 
complementary and lawfully unalterable principles: the operation of a democratic 
legislature and the operation of independent courts."65 
This is not a threat to Parliament from the courts. It is not an assertion of the 
right to govern in Parliament's stead, but rather an acknowledgement of the law-
making partnership of these two branches of government. In any event Hon M Kirby's 
deference to Parliament is qualified by requiring Parliament to be acting "within 
power. "66 But if Parliament has unlimited power then it must always be acting within 
power and this qualification makes no sense, unless he is merely referring to the limits 
of state legislatures in a federal system. 
IV CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND: 1984 - 2001 
The constitutional times have changed since Lord Cooke's dicta were uttered, 
necessitating a fresh look at the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Thomas J has 
identified four major themes. These are the recognition of fundamental human rights, 
the Treaty of Waitangi, the changed electoral system, and the ongoing development 
of judicial review.67 
A New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
New Zealand now has the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) which guarantees 
a range of human rights. It does not have superior law status and thus maintains the 
"supremacy" of Parliament,68 although in a review of its first decade of operation, one 
commentator has suggested that the courts actually treat it as an entrenched superior 
65 
Sir Robin Cooke "Fundamentals" [1988] NZLJ 158, 164. 
66 
Hon Michael Kirby "Lord Cooke and Fundamental Rights" in P Rishworth (ed) The Struggle for 
Simplicity in the Law: Essays for Lord Cooke ofThorndon (Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) 331,353. 
67 
Justice E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two 
for the New Millennium" (2000) 31 VUWLR 5, 9-14. 
13 
Bill of Rights.69 Whether or not this is so, at the least it has had the effect of providing 
"a set of navigation lights for the whole process of government to observe. "70 
Although BORA merely affirms the rights listed within it, the courts have used it as 
the basis for legal remedies in the event of a breach, notwithstanding the removal of a 
remedies clause at the select committee stage of the Bill's passage.71 
More recently the Court of Appeal has stated that they have the power and 
sometimes the duty to indicate that a statutory provision is inconsistent with the rights 
affirmed in BORA.72 This is a new role the Court has created for itself, in contrast to 
the later Human Rights Act 1999 (UK) which explicitly sets out this role of judicial 
comment on the substance of legislation.73 Although these judicial indications of 
inconsistency do not directly challenge legislation, in a sense they will, because of the 
inevitable effect such a declaration would have on public opinion and thus political 
pressure to change the law to conform to the court's decision.74 Butler wonders 
whether, after becoming comfortable with such an advisory role as regards BORA, 
the courts might then expand this role into other areas, such as whether legislation 
complies with Treaty principles.75 To extend this reasoning, eventually the Court may 
not feel much discomfort invalidating legislation in what they consider to be an 
appropriate case. By that stage it might be just another small step in the expansion of 
such a power. 
The Human Right Act Amendment Bill 2001 has recently been introduced to 
Parliament and provides that declarations of inconsistency are the sole remedy for 
legislation or regulations that are found to be unjustifiably discriminatory and 
therefore inconsistent with the BORA standard.76 It also provides that the Minister 
must table that declaration in Parliament along with the government's response.This 
has followed from the Ministry of Justice Report on the Re-evaluation of Human 
Rights Protections in New Zealand, in which the review team were not able to make a 
68 Section 4. 
69 
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specific recommendation on the subject.77 One member proposed that section 4 of 
BORA be amended to create a procedure by which courts could declare that a statute 
is incompatible, while leaving Parliament to decide what, if any, action to take.78 
Others however, felt it would be best for the time being to let the judicial process 
evolve, as it had the potential to "enhance constitutional values and the level of trust 
between Parliament and the judiciary," while also noting that, "lack of trust between 
Parliament, the electorate and the judiciary was one of the main reasons the original 
proposal to entrench the Bill of Rights was defeated."79 
The Human Rights Act Amendment Bill would therefore seem to represent a 
halfway measure. A statutory power of declaration would seem to have more force 
than an "indication," and combined with a procedure whereby Parliament would be 
required to respond to such a declaration, this would appear to be effectively a review 
of legislation by the courts, and provide a legal remedy for those whose rights were 
infringed by offending legislation. Looking at the proposed amendment in a different 
way however, it might be said that Parliament, by expressly defining the Court's role 
in this one area, would make it more difficult for the judiciary to expand the scope of 
such declarations over time into other areas . So although in the short term these 
declarations could be seen to be enhancing already appropriated judicial power, on a 
long-term view, Parliament might well be fettering any further judicial developments. 
B Treaty of Waitangi 
The changed status of the Treaty of Waitangi in recent times as a now 
fundamental part of New Zealand's (unwritten) constitution may also place a limit on 
Parliament's ability to amend or revoke the rights contained in it. The status of the 
Treaty may mean that British ideas of Sovereignty are inappropriate to describe the 
New Zealand constitution. It is beyond the scope of this essay to examine the 
constitutional place of the Treaty, but if it is a "fundamental constitutional 
76 
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document," 80 then it is questionable whether the rights conferred in it can be modified 
or revoked by Parliament. According to Thomas J, that question can only be answered 
by the courts if Parliament seeks to do so one day by legislative means. 81 And since 
Parliament, meanwhile, seems content to leave it to the common law to determine 
what these rights are, by inserting very broad provisions into legislation requiring 
recognition of the Treaty,82 a future court may well be resistant to their possible 
abrogation by a future Parliament. 
C Introduction of MMP 
New Zealand has also seen major changes in the electoral system. The 
introduction of Mixed Member Proportional representation (MMP) in 1993 was seen 
as likely to slow down the passage of legislation by making negotiation and 
compromise between coalition partners necessary, and by making the system less 
friendly to executive power, 83 a reaction against previous administrations. Times may 
have changed, but sometimes not by very much, as Taggart describes the Education 
Amendment Act 1998. This was passed under budget urgency in less than two days 
without reference to Select Committee or to the Legislation Advisory Committee, and 
without a section 7 Bill of Rights report from the Attorney-General. Such steps were 
arguably required, as Part II of the amendment was completely unrelated to Part I 
(which concerned the budget matter of bulk funding for schools) and allowed 
polytechnics to amalgamate with universities. It also allowed the government to 
extricate itself from pending litigation, in which review was sought of the Minister of 
Education's decision to recommend the amalgamation of Wellington Polytechnic and 
Massey University. The amalgamation was arguably contrary to the Scheme of the 
Education Act 1989. In addition, since the amending Act effectively stopped the 
litigation in its tracks, it was a possible breach of section 27(3) of the Bill of Rights 
Act 1990, which provides that every person has the right to bring civil proceedings 
against the Crown and have them heard in the same way as proceedings between 
80 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1996) 3 NZLR 140, 184-185 (CA). 
81 Justice E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two 
for the New Millennium" (2000) 31 VUWLR 5, 9. 
82 See, for example, the Conservation Act 1987, s4; and the Resource Management Act 1991, s8. 
83 
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individuals.84 This example shows that dubious legislation can still be rushed through 
Parliament bypassing such constitutional safeguards that exist. 
Even though the legislature may not have totally changed, the different 
electoral system is another reason why British ideas of parliamentary sovereignty may 
not be as appropriate as they once were, if indeed they ever were appropriate, given 
the lack of an upper house to act as a check on a Parliament that has been called "the 
fastest law-maker in the west. "85 
D The Expansion of Judicial Review 
It is no coincidence that the judges who publicly challenge parliamentary 
sovereignty are active in the administrative law field. As such they are quite 
comfortable with the concept of reviewing executive action on the basis of, or as 
Thomas J prefers, "under the guise of," giving effect to Parliament's will. 86 The ultra 
vires principle is necessary to accommodate the coexistence of judicial review and 
parliamentary sovereignty because it means all limits on statutory discretionary power 
derive from the intention of Parliament. Thomas J says however, that it is a 
" ... convenient rationalisation. It cannot explain away all instances of judicial 
intervention, and, at times, certainly serves to allow the judiciary to conceal the real 
justification for developments in judicial review."87 This recognises the fine line that 
exists between the review of a power granted pursuant to an Act, and review of the 
Act itself. As Anisminic and other cases show, sometimes the courts are in fact acting 
contrary to Parliamentary intention.88 Judicial review can only be reconciled with 
parliamentary sovereignty if courts are enforcing limits on executive power that 
Parliament has intended. Otherwise the imposition of independent common law limits 
involves the courts declaring unlawful the very powers that Parliament has intended to 
confer. If the somewhat artificial ultra vires principle is discarded, as Thomas J would 
84 
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advocate, then judicial review becomes an independent principle of the common law 
and is separated from the carrying out of Parliament's will. 89 
The Law Commission has recently published a study paper containing an 
argument by its president, Justice Baragwanath, that the Judicature Amendment Acts 
1972 and 1977, which provide procedures parallel to those in the common law, should 
for the most part be repealed. The substantive law of judicial review would be left to 
the common law.90 One of the main reasons for this recommendation is that the scope 
of the common law remedy has expanded greatly since these Acts were passed, 
contrary to the expectation that the statutory grounds for review would replace the 
common law. This has lead to a range of overlapping options seen as " ... at best, 
awkward and potentially confusing and therefore productive of injustice. "91 The paper 
argues that no attempt at codification should be made and judicial review should be 
left to judicial development.92 This would give the courts the potential to greatly 
increase the scope of judicial review and could make it difficult for a future 
Parliament to attempt to limit the extent of the courts' supervisory role. However, the 
Law Commission clearly stated that the paper is published as a work of legal 
scholarship only, and does not represent a statement of the Commission's views, and 
so the recommendation may be unlikely to progress.93 
The judiciary sees its role in this area as the protection of individuals against 
the overwhelming power of the state, and so judicial activism increases at times of 
increased executive power given at the expense of the legislature. Or as Lord Woolf 
put it, "if one chain slackens, then another needs to take the strain. "94 If the judiciary 
perceived an overwhelming need for the protection of individual rights, or to 
procedural safeguards against egregious legislation, which are the province of judicial 
review now in the sphere of executive action, then an extension of judicial review 
might be the avenue chosen to declare an Act unconstitutional or invalid. Bonham's 
Case itself could be seen as a review of the decision-making powers given to the 
Royal College of Physicians pursuant to statute. Four out of the five cases in which 
89 
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Lord Cooke questioned Parliament's legislative power were applications for judicial 
review as was the Anisminic case. This is the context in which it may be likely for 
courts to extend their supervisory jurisdiction from executive to legislative action. 
E Justice Thomas's "Tentative Thoughts"-A Contemporary Constitution 
The most recent judicial opinion expressed on the relationship between 
Parliament and the courts in New Zealand is that of Court of Appeal judge Justice E 
W Thomas. Delivering the Victoria University Law Faculty Centennial Lecture in 
1999, he said: 95 
the possibility that courts may review the validity of extreme legislation is part of the ongoing 
development of a dynamic constitution rather than a reassertion of the authority of cases long 
since gone and regularly disavowed. 
Thomas J draws support for his thesis from Lord Cooke and also from the 
extra-judicial views of some prominent English judges who have questioned the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, at a time of largely Executive-run governments 
in Britain during the 1990s, and of increasing activism in the field of judicial review 
as courts have sought to limit Executive rule. Lord Woolf's approach, which he 
admits as being " ... a shadow reflection of a trail blazed by Sir Robin Cooke," also 
recognises that the courts and parliament are partners in upholding the rule of law and 
that courts will sometimes be required to take a stand in upholding that principle.96 
His view is that, if Parliament "did the unthinkable," then rather than relying on 
restrictive readings of statutes, there would be "advantages in making it clear that 
ultimately there are even limits on the supremacy of Parliament which it is the courts' 
inalienable responsibility to identify and uphold."97 But Thomas J does not subscribe 
to the view that Parliament has never enjoyed sovereign power because fundamental 
law is supreme over statute law, as Coke CJ and Lord Cooke suggested. For him there 
is too much authority to the contrary.98 Nor does he see the need to rely on the idea of 
a higher-order law such as has been suggested by Sir John Laws and Sir Stephen 
95 
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Sedley.99 Rather, democracy means the people are sovereign and there is no place for 
the language of supremacy, either of Parliament or the Courts. Both institutions have 
separate constitutional roles in protecting representative government, the rule of law 
and fundamental human rights. 100 
F Where Does This Leave Bonham's Case? 
Believing that it would require "a traumatic departure from established legal 
methodology to resurrect the authority of Bonham's Case," Thomas J would prefer to 
leave the answer "up in the constitutional air." 101 His view is that the resulting 
uncertainty achieves a balance of power between Parliament and the courts: 102 
Uncertainty as to whether the courts will intervene to strike down legislation perceived to 
undermine representative government and destroy fundamental rights must act as a brake upon 
Parliament's conception of its omnipotence; and uncertainty as to the legitimacy of its 
jurisdiction to invalidate constitutionally aberrant legislation must act as a curb upon judicial 
usurpation of power. 
This uncertainty answers Hon M Kirby's criticisms of unelected judges invalidating 
laws made by elected representatives. Again there is no assertion that the Court of 
Appeal rule New Zealand, but rather the judiciary would seek to curb Parliament's 
power in the interests of justice and only in extreme circumstances. Thomas J perhaps 
provides the meaning of Willies J's dictum in Lee v Bude and Torrington Railway Co 
to the effect that Bonham's Case " ... stands as a warning, rather than as an authority to 
be followed." 103 Surely the courts would not issue a warning if they had no power to 
assert against Parliament. 
Despite Thomas J's views there is still a place for Bonham's Case and Lord 
Cooke's dicta. Coke CJ's and Cooke J's utterances are products of their times; the 
reigns of both King James and Prime Minister Robert Muldoon; when the balance 
between the power of the Legislature, the Executive and the Courts was threatened. 
The dicta are important because they would provide support for a future court in 
99 
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extreme circumstances. Because of the way in which the common law works, a court 
would look to authority. Indeed Sir Edward Coke based his decision in Bonham's 
Case on precedent that was, even by 1610, of great antiquity. McHugh says: 104 
The present .. . is an eternal one to the common law. Its own internal logic requires that the 
common law has always been able to treat a case from, for example 1774, as having just as 
much argumentative worth as one from 1974. The common law reconstructs its past as one of 
doctrinal coherence in which a contemporary state of affairs is perpetually immanent. 
Courts are restricted to deciding issues that come before them. As such their role is 
reactive, so it would be left to be Parliament to test the limits by enacting a statute that 
was likely to receive a frosty judicial reception. Therefore, although Thomas J would 
seem to advocate a balance of power by means of a vacuum, the advantage of this 
approach is that Parliament must either exercise legislative caution, or be very clear in 
what it is seeking to do by legislative means, and aware of the possible risk of conflict 
with the courts. 
Interestingly, the newly released Legislative Advisory Committee Guidelines 
require legislation to comply with fundamental common law principles. 105 Although 
stating that an Act of Parliament will override the common law in the event of 
inconsistency, the guidelines also state that courts will be reluctant to interpret 
legislation in a manner that conflicts with the common law. It is therefore "the 
responsibility of the Executive and of Parliament to avoid imposing such pressures on 
the courts as to risk constitutional brinkmanship." 106 The Cabinet Manual further 
states that Ministers must confirm compliance with the LAC Guidelines when bids for 
Bills to be included in the programme are awarded. 107 This seems an explicit 
recognition of the "uncertainty" that Thomas J sees as providing the balance of power 
in our constitutional arrangements. In other words, because Parliament is unsure of 
how the courts would react if confronted by legislation that was inconsistent with 
common law principles, they will avoid such a situation occurring. 
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Lord Irving, while highly critical of judicial questioning of Parliament's 
powers, admits that if the situation arose: 108 
. . . it would be for the judges of that time, and not of today, to decide how they should properly 
respond .. . and [they] might gain some comfort in their endeavours from the extra-judicial 
writings of distinguished judges of today. 
Mann has said that the real question would be whether the judges had "the strength of 
character." 109 Thomas J asserts that he has, and sees no need to seek support from 
previous judicial authority. But a future court might need more assistance at a difficult 
time. They may, as Caldwell says of Lord Cooke, " . .. be grateful that a Court of 
Appeal Judge who lived in a time of peace and relative freedom had the strength of 
character to provide the basis for nullifying an Act of Parliament." 110 And they may 
be grateful to his self-described "quite well known forebear, Sir Edward Coke" 111 for 
the statement that, as Jennings says, "if the occasion arose, a judge would do what a 
judge should do." 112 
V GOLDSWORTHY'S DEFENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY 
A History 
In a recent and extensive work, Professor Goldsworthy sets out to challenge 
the critics of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 11 3 Tracing the doctrine from 
the age of Bracton to the end of the nineteenth century, he concludes from the 
historical evidence that the sovereignty of Parliament has been accepted for at least 
several centuries by all three branches of government, and therefore is not the creation 
of nineteenth century academic lawyers, such as Dicey. Consequently he states that 
judges could not invalidate an Act of Parliament: 114 
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... on the ground that it would revive a venerable tradition of English law, a golden age of 
constitutional ism, in which the judiciary enforced limits to the authority of Parliament imposed 
by common law or natural law. There never was such an age. 
As for Bonham's Case, Goldsworthy says that even if Coke CJ did advocate a 
power to declare a statute void, he later changed his mind when he said, " ... the power 
and jurisdiction of the Parliament, for making of Laws in proceeding by Bill. .. is so 
transcendent and absolute, as it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within 
any bounds." 115 The meaning of this statement has also been debated by scholars 
whose different interpretations accord with their own view of the relationship between 
Parliament and the courts. For example, Allan, a critic of parliamentary sovereignty, 
prefers the view of Mcllwain that Coke's conception of the supremacy of Parliament 
was different to the modem sense of a total absence of limits, and this later statement 
of Coke CJ should be understood in the context of Parliament being a superior court 
with both legislative and judicial functions which were not clearly distinguished. 116 
Furthermore, Allan asserts that since Blackstone cited this statement of Sir Edward 
Coke in support of parliamentary sovereignty, while also accepting that "Acts of 
Parliament that are impossible to be performed are of no validity," he was confused. 
His emphasis on the separation of powers and the fundamental rights of Englishmen 
are contradicted by his apparent support of Parliament's sovereign and uncontrollable 
authority, and Allan says Dicey: "simply perpetuated Blackstone's confusion." 117 It 
seems therefore, that whether or not Coke CJ changed his mind is still as moot a point 
as his apparent assertion that the courts could challenge the validity of an Act of 
Parliament. 
B Philosophy 
Goldsworthy also examines philosophical debates about parliamentary 
sovereignty, and adopting a Hartian analysis, 11 8 concludes that parliamentary 
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sovereignty is a rule of recognition which judges did not create, and so cannot change, 
uni laterally. 119 The most senior legal officials, including judges, have for a very long 
time recognised as legally valid whatever statutes Parliament has enacted, and have 
often said that they are bound to do so. Thus they have adopted the internal point of 
view towards the sovereignty of Parliament which is, according to Goldsworthy, a 
central component of the rule of recognition in the British legal system. 120 Up to this 
point it might be said that Thomas J would agree since he states that, although open to 
change by ongoing constitutional development, Parliament has enjoyed sovereignty 
because "the doctrine has been endorsed so often by the courts." 121 This internal point 
of view may be doubted however, when it is noted that, not only has parliamentary 
sovereignty come under increasing judicial criticism, including by Thomas J, but that 
the oft-cited judicial "endorsement" has come from cases of dubious authority. 
Wilson says about these cases that: 122 
... it is a strange feature of writing on this subject that the strongest statements of the principle 
in all its glory, cited without comment in all the books, are from three cases on private railway 
Acts ... Somewhat surprisingly these three cases, all of which, besides being relatively trivial, 
centred on alleged failures of procedure and not the contents of the legislation, are constantly 
cited for the much wider proposition that the courts will not listen to any challenge on the 
validity of an Act of Parliament on any ground whatever. 
Goldsworthy admits, "courts can initiate change, provided that the other 
branches of government are willing to accept it," and cites as an example, the exercise 
of judicial review of royal prerogatives. 123 He believes that the courts have been 
permitted to expand their authority to control the exercise of power by executive 
government only because its attitudes as well their own have changed. But it could 
equally be said that the courts have appropriated this power and the Executive has 
acquiesced in the appropriation. Goldsworthy does not believe the other branches of 
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government would accept a unilateral rejection of parliamentary sovereignty by the 
courts. However it can also be argued that they might not protest, particularly if the 
rejection was a slow and gradual one. 
Hart's rule of recognition itself can be criticised. Barber argues that assuming 
one ultimate supreme rule at the top of the English legal system does not adequately 
reflect the reality of the English Constitution. 124 He contends, using examples of 
parliamentary privilege 125 and European Community law, 126 that the English 
constitution contains multiple unranked sources of Jaw, which can be in-econcilable 
but will nonetheless fit within the system, if they do not, or do not often produce 
conflict. This must be even more so in ew Zealand as regards the Treaty of Waitangi 
and its treatment by the courts. 127 In this context McHugh says: "The political system 
- including its legal sphere - acknowledges now what previously it sought to suppress, 
namely the presence of dispersed sites of political authority within the existing 
constitutional framework." 128 Under such an analysis, parliamentary sovereignty and 
judicial review of legislation in appropriate future circumstances, can both be 
accommodated under present constitutional a1Tangements. If the legal system is not 
hierarchical, but instead contains various sources of law which sit side by side, it is far 
less radical for the judiciary to reject the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty than 
under Goldsworthy's analysis. 
The best that citizens can expect from Goldsworthy's conclusions are that 
Judges could only challenge Parliament morally and not legally. Judges therefore 
have no greater powers to resist an extreme law than ordinary citizens, who would 
also be morally entitled to disobey such a Jaw. This positivist stance of Goldsworthy, 
following Hart, whereby Jaws of even totally evil content are valid, but should not be 
obeyed, is open to criticism. As Primus says, "[a] positivism that does not counsel 
obedience to bad laws is barely worth debating," since it no longer has any normative 
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significance. 129 Thomas J asserts that because of the power imbalance between citizen 
and state, and in a situation where the legislature is subservient to the executive, the 
judiciary represents "the most immediately available and authoritative resource to 
discern and publicly proclaim the unconstitutionality of legislation." 130 The judicial 
declarations of inconsistency, discussed above in the Bill of Rights context, represent 
a step in this direction. And as a normative proposition, such a judicial position must 
be preferable to the one which positivism advocates. But if Goldsworthy is correct, 
then a supe1ior law Bill of Rights becomes highly desirable. He asserts that if Judges 
could invalidate Acts of Parliament now then there would be no need for a judicially 
enforceable Bill of Rights. However, leaving the issue open until circumstances 
dictate an answer, has the advantage that, at best, the courts would succeed in reining 
in a potentially despotic Parliament. At worst, the courts could at least make the 
attempt, and if it failed, a constitutional crisis would ensue, out of which a written Bill 
of Rights would undoubtedly be born. 
VI POLITICS 
The major criticism of judicial review of legislation is that it is undemocratic 
for unelected judges to ove11urn what an elected Parliament has enacted. As 
Goldsworthy puts it: 131 
What is at stake is the location of ultimate decision-making authority - the right to the 'final 
word' - in a legal system. If the judges were to repudiate the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, by refusing to allow Parliament to infringe unwritten rights, they would be 
claiming that ultimate authority for themselves . .. and this would amount to a massive transfer of 
political power from parliaments to judges. 
Indeed the United States Presidential election in 2000 provides an example of what 
could be considered undesirable judicial supremacism, where the Supreme Court 
judges, in effect, decided the result in favour of the Republican candidate by a vote of 
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five to four along party lines. 132 But Goldsworthy's criticism is too extreme, as it fails 
to take into account what the judicial critics of parliamentary sovereignty actually 
advocate, such as Lord Woolf who sees the limits as "of the most modest dimensions 
which I believe any democracy would accept." 133 
Furthermore, as a matter of reality in New Zealand, judges are more and more 
frequently called upon to make political decisions. Parliament has accepted such 
developments, even encouraging them, as in the Bill of Rights arena, although they 
are not new, but have been gathering momentum towards the end of the twentieth 
century and the beginning of the twenty-first. Wade has said that judges are" ... up to 
their necks in policy, as they have been all through history .... "134 
Barber argues that in the Westminster system judges wield political as well as 
legal power. According to his thesis "in some situations they appear to be accorded 
political auth01ity by the constitutional system to make decisions contrary to the 
existing law." 135 Thus they can alter the law, contrary to the law, and are obeyed. If it 
could be shown that they are justified in acting this way, it would show that this is a 
legitimate authority. That is, not only do they make decisions contrary to the law, but 
that they are right to do so. 
Two examples illustrate this proposition. In R v R, 136 the marital rape case, the 
House of Lords expanded the law of rape to include liability for husbands who raped 
their wives. In the statute rape was defined as "unlawful" non-consensual sexual 
intercourse. Lord Keith declared that the word 'unlawful' added nothing to the 
meaning of the section, notwithstanding that the statute, which was only 14 years old 
(and had also been reviewed), contemplated legal non-consensual sexual intercourse, 
such as the common law rule that a husband could not rape his wife. The House of 
Lords changed the statute for moral reasons only, contrary to the normal interpretation 
of criminal statutes in favour of the defendant, stating that "in modem times any 
reasonable person must regard [the immunity] as quite unacceptable." 137 Factortame 
shows, according to Barber, that notwithstanding the view that an earlier Parliament 
could not bind a later Parliament, the earlier Act governed. Since these decisions are 
132 Bush v Gore (2000) 531 US l. 
133 Rt Hon Lord Woolf of Barnes "Droit Public-English Style" [1995] Public Laiv 57, 69 . 
134 H R W Wade Constitutional Fundamentals (Stevens and Sons, London, 1989) 78. 
135 N W Barber "Sovereignty Re-examined: The Courts, Parliament, and Statutes" (2000) 20 OJLS 131, 
151. 
136 [1992] l AC 599 (HL). 
137 R v R [1992] l AC 599,616 (HL). 
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obeyed by all the other constitutional actors, this may mean that judges can deny the 
sovereignty of Parliament to achieve a particular moral objective (such as abolishing a 
husband's immunity for raping his wife), or political objective (Britain's ability to take 
part in the European Union). 
Barber states that "[the courts'] authority does not run out when their legal 
power is exhausted." The truth of this statement is established by the decisions in 
Factortame and R v R, where "the force of these decisions flowed from the judges' 
political legitimacy, not from their application of the law." 138 On this analysis it is 
arguable that a judicial challenge to parliamentary sovereignty, even if contrary to 
law, is judicial authority based on political legitimacy. Otherwise on Allan's analysis, 
principles already in the law justify such decisions, or else they are illegitimate 
political decisions.
139 
He can find good legal reasons for the Factortame decision 
without having to call it a "revolution." 140 
Accepting Barber's proposition makes it easier to reconcile the orthodox view of 
judicial deference to Parliament with the constitutional truth, which is that a purely 
legal analysis does not adequately explain the relationship between the courts and 
Parliament. 
Vil CONCLUSION 
Whatever Coke CJ really meant in Bonham's Case remams a matter for 
speculation. However, because of its dramatic and unambiguous language, it will 
always be cited for the proposition that a court may strike down an Act of Parliament 
in appropriate circumstances. New Zealand jurisprudence also contains a series of 
dicta to essentially the same effect from a judge described as "New Zealand's most 
distinguished jurist ever." 141 Such cases may be criticised or explained away, 
nevertheless they remain on the books, and in reality as merely a warning to 
Parliament to legislate cautiously, rather than as an assertion of judicial supremacy. 
Critics such as Goldsworthy offer persuasive arguments, particularly on a 
historical analysis and a picture that is painted of a small group of the unelected elite 
138 Barber, above, 152. 
139 T R S Allan "Parliamentary Sovereignty: Law, Politics, and Revolution" ( 1997) 113 LQR 443. 
140 See, for example, Sir William Wade "Sovereignty - Revolution or Evolution?" (1996) 112 LQR 
568. 
wielding political power gained undemocratically. But this is not what the judges 
seem to advocate. The argument is instead for a law-making partnership between 
Parliament and Courts. Partnership is a now familiar concept in the New Zealand 
constitutional context. The Crown in Parliament accepts it is in partnership with 
Maori. The electoral system under MMP makes Parliament, by necessity, a place of 
partnership, negotiation and compromise. The positivist notions of command and 
obedience are not suited to the language of partnership and therefore, along with the 
idea of parliamentary omnipotence, may be obsolete, belonging only to constitutional 
history. A changing conception of sovereignty from a hierarchy to a division of 
power, which is in any case a more fitting description of a modern democracy, make 
judicial review of legislation a far Jess radical development. 
Jennings says that because it is difficult to prove a negative, it is "virtually 
impossible to prove that there are no principles of the common Jaw which Parliament 
cannot repeal." 142 The other side of the coin is that it might be as impossible to say 
that the judiciary could not overturn an Act of Parliament. If a judicial challenge to an 
Act of Parliament occurred in future, it might not be seen as a revolution, but as a 
natural development of both New Zealand's constitutional ainngements and of the 
common law. 
Thomas J says, "The debate continues. Lawyers, being lawyers , look for a 
definitive answer." 143 A definitive answer might be comforting, but for now there is 
not, and arguably should not be one. The debate is more important than the answer. 
141 Kevin Norquay "Time Catches up With NZ's Greatest Jurist" (12 May 2001) The Do111i11io11, 
Wellington, 17, quoting Sir Geoffrey Palmer. 
142 Sir Ivor Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5ed, Un iversity of London Press, London, 1959) 
159-160. 
143 Justice E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two 
for the New Millennium" (2000) 3 1 VUWLR 5, 6. 
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